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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 




AMERICAN EUROCOPTER, LLC. DEFENDANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [21]. After reviewing 
the motion, rules, and authorities, the Court finds as follows:
BACKGROUND
On February 4, 2010, the Plaintiff, Yolanda Lowe, filed suit against the Defendant 
alleging race and gender discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., age 
discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et 
seq, and disability discrimination and disability-based hostile work environment under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 et seq. On March 3, 2010, 
Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss [8], claiming that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her 
administrative remedies and that Plaintiff’s Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted.
On December 16, 2010, the Court entered an Order [17] dismissing Plaintiff’s claims of 
gender, race, and age discrimination, but allowing Plaintiff’s claims of disability discrimination 
and disability-based hostile work environment to remain. Apparently, on September 29, 2010, 
which was after Plaintiff filed her discrimination claims in this Court, Plaintiff filed a voluntary 
petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy
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Court for the Northern District of Mississippi.1 During this bankruptcy proceeding, Plaintiff 
failed to disclose the instant lawsuit to the bankruptcy court and her creditors. On the schedule of 
assets and liabilities and statement of financial affairs filed with the bankruptcy court, Plaintiff 
declared under penalty of perjury that she had no contingent or unliquidated claims of any 
nature. On December 13, 2010, the bankruptcy court entered an order confirming Plaintiff’s 
Chapter 13 plan. Thereafter, the Defendant filed the instant motion for summary judgment, 
alleging that Plaintiff should be judicially estopped from asserting her claims against it because 
she did not disclose her claims in the bankruptcy proceeding.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment is warranted under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure when evidence reveals no genuine dispute regarding any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The rule “mandates the entry of 
summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails 
to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s 
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 
U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986).
The party moving for summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the 
district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it 
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323. The nonmoving 
party must then “go beyond the pleadings” and “designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324 (citation omitted). In reviewing the evidence, factual
1 Defendant asserts that it did not become aware of Plaintiff’s bankruptcy case until 
January 14, 2011, when Defendant’s counsel performed a search on Plaintiff under the 
bankruptcy docket.
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controversies are to be resolved in favor of the nonmovant, “but only when . . . both parties have 
submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th 
Cir. 1994) (en banc). When such contradictory facts exist, the Court may “not make credibility 
determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 
133, 150, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105 (2000). However, conclusory allegations, 
speculation, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic arguments have never constituted an 
adequate substitute for specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick 
James of Wash., 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002); SEC v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir. 
1997); Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.
JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL
“Judicial estoppel is a common law doctrine that prevents a party from assuming 
inconsistent positions in litigation.” In re Superior Crewboats, Inc., 374 F.3d 330, 334 (5th Cir. 
2004) (citing Brandon v. Interfirst Corp., 858 F.2d 266, 268 (5th Cir. 1988)). “‘The purpose of 
the doctrine is to protect the integrity of the judicial process by preventing parties from playing 
fast and loose with the courts to suit the exigencies of self interest.’” Id. (quoting In re Coastal 
Plains, 179 F.3d 197, 205 (5th Cir. 1999)). “[B]ecause judicial estoppel is designed to protect 
the judicial system, not the litigants, detrimental reliance by the party opponent is not required.” 
Id.
The Fifth Circuit has not hesitated to apply judicial estoppel to foreclose a party from 
pursuing a cause of action where the party, a debtor in bankruptcy, has concealed his claim from 
the bankruptcy court, and in fact, has held that “[j]udicial estoppel is particularly appropriate 
where, as here, a party fails to disclose an asset to a bankruptcy court, but then pursues a claim in 
a separate tribunal based on that undisclosed asset.” Kamont v. West, 83 F. App’x 1, 3 (5th Cir.
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2003). According to the Fifth Circuit, “[a] court should apply judicial estoppel if (1) the position 
of the party against which estoppel is sought is plainly inconsistent with its prior legal position;
(2) the party against which estoppel is sought convinced a court to accept the prior position; and
(3) the party did not act inadvertently.” Jethroe v. Omnova Solutions, Inc., 412 F.3d 598, 600 
(5th Cir. 2005). Each of these elements is satisfied here.
A. Element One: Inconsistent Positions
By representing to the bankruptcy court that she had no assets other than those listed in 
her bankruptcy schedules and then pursuing this cause of action, the Plaintiff has unquestionably 
taken inconsistent positions and, by failing to even respond to Defendant’s motion, Plaintiff does 
not appear to contend otherwise. In Superior Crewboats, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the 
debtors’ commencement and pursuit of a personal injury lawsuit subsequent to the initiation of 
their bankruptcy proceeding, was “clearly inconsistent” with their bankruptcy case, in which they 
failed to disclose their cause of action. Emphasizing the continuing nature of a debtor’s duty of 
disclosure, the court stated,
It goes without saying that the Bankruptcy Code and Rules impose upon 
bankruptcy debtors an express, affirmative duty to disclose all assets, including 
contingent and unliquidated claims.” Coastal Plains, 179 F.3d at 207-08 (emphasis 
in original). The duty to disclose is continuous. Id. Thus, under Coastal Plains, the 
Hudspeaths’ omission of the personal injury claim from their mandatory 
bankruptcy filings is tantamount to a representation that no such claim existed. Id. 
at 210. Now, however, the Hudspeaths contend, before the state court and in the 
limitation proceeding, that the personal injury claim is viable and worth $2.5 
million. Such blatant inconsistency readily satisfies the first prong of the judicial 
estoppel inquiry.
Superior Crewboats, 374 F.3d at 335; see also Jethroe, 412 F.3d at 600 (reiterating that “[t]he 
obligation to disclose pending and unliquidated claims in bankruptcy proceedings is an ongoing 
one”); Kamont, 83 F. App’x at 3 (filing of EEOC charge while bankruptcy case was pending 
“trigger[ed] a duty to amend her bankruptcy petition,” and by failing to do so, plaintiff was
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estopped from pursuing discrimination claim). Further, “[a]ny claim with potential must be 
disclosed, even if it is contingent, dependent, or conditional.” Coastal Plains, 179 F.3d at 208. 
As such, the first prong of the judicial estoppel test is satisfied.
B. Element Two: Court Acceptance of Previous Position
Plaintiff’s plan of confirmation in the bankruptcy court was initially approved, and was 
not thereafter amended, based on the bankruptcy court’s impression, as drawn from Plaintiff’s 
bankruptcy schedules, that Plaintiff had no contingent or unliquidated claims of any nature. In 
Jethroe, the Fifth Circuit found that the second prong of the judicial estoppel inquiry was 
satisfied because the bankruptcy court “certainly confirmed [the debtor’s] plan at least in part 
based on its assessment of her assets and liabilities.” 412 F.3d at 600. Further, for judicial 
estoppel to apply, adoption or acceptance of a party’s position “does not require a formal 
judgment; rather, it only requires ‘that the first court has adopted the position urged by the party, 
either as a preliminary matter or as part of a final disposition.’” Superior Crewboats, 374 F.3d at 
335 (quoting Coastal Plains, 179 F.3d at 206). Because the Plaintiff failed to disclose her 
potential claims against the Defendant and the bankruptcy court relied on such nondisclosure, the 
second element is satisfied.
C. Element Three: Inadvertence
In regards to the third prong of the judicial estoppel test, the Fifth Circuit has held that 
“based on the importance of full disclosure in bankruptcy, in considering judicial estoppel for 
bankruptcy cases, the debtor’s failure to satisfy its statutory disclosure duty is ‘inadvertent’ only 
when, in general, the debtor either lacks knowledge of the undisclosed claims or has no motive 
for their concealment.” Coastal Plains, 179 F.3d at 210. In this case, there is no basis for 
concluding that Plaintiff’s failure to disclose this litigation to the bankruptcy court was
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“inadvertent.” First, Plaintiff did not respond to Defendant’s motion; thus, Plaintiff makes no
attempt to explain or excuse her blatant omission in this regard. Second, even if Plaintiff
attempted to show that she did not fully understand the duty to disclose all legal claims, such an
argument would not suffice. In order for a debtor to lack knowledge of an undisclosed claim, the
debtor must have been unaware o f the facts giving rise to her claim when she represented that
she had no potential claim to the bankruptcy court. See Jethroe, 412 F.3d at 600. Merely
demonstrating an unawareness of the legal duty to disclose is not enough. Id. Plaintiff was
clearly aware that she had claims against the Defendant when the lawsuit was omitted from the
bankruptcy filings, as she not only filed the Complaint herself as a pro se litigant, but she also
actively filed other documents and motions in this Court, including a Motion to Proceed In
Forma Pauperis [2] and a Response [15] to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [8].
Additionally, the Plaintiff here had motive to conceal this litigation. If she ultimately
recovered on her claims, she would not be required to give any potential monetary award to her
creditors. As the Fifth Circuit noted in Superior Crewboats,
The [plaintiffs] had the requisite motivation to conceal the claim as they would 
certainly reap a windfall had they been able to recover on the undisclosed claim 
without having disclosed it to the creditors. Such a result would permit debtors to 
“[c]onceal their claims; get rid of [their] creditors on the cheap, and start over 
with a bundle of rights.”
374 F.3d at 336 (internal citations omitted); see also Cargo v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 408 B.R. 
631, 639 (W.D. La. 2009) (“Indeed, a motive to conceal claims subsists in all bankruptcy cases 
in which a concealed legal claim would, if disclosed, form part of the bankruptcy estate and the
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debtor is aware of the claim’s monetary value.”). Accordingly, because the Court concludes that 
the Plaintiff did not act “inadvertently,” the third element is satisfied.2
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that all three elements of the judicial 
estoppel test are satisfied and, for this reason, Plaintiff should be estopped from pursuing her 
claims herein. Thus, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
So ordered on this, the 22nd day of June, 2011.
/s/ Sharion Aycock____________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
2 A common argument made in judicial estoppel and bankruptcy cases is that the 
individual should be allowed to reopen or amend or supplement their bankruptcy proceeding to 
include the undisclosed lawsuit. The Court notes that such arguments have been consistently 
rejected. See Barnes v. Pemco Areoplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1288 (11th Cir. 2002) (cited with 
approval by the Fifth Circuit in In re Superior Crewboats, Inc., 374 F.3d 330, 336 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(“Allowing [the debtor] to back up, reopen the bankruptcy case, and amend h[er] bankruptcy 
filings, only after h[er] omission has been challenged by an adversary, suggests that a debtor 
should consider disclosing personal assets only if [s]he is caught concealing them.”)); Loyd v. 
Harrah’s Shreveport/Bossier City Holding Co., LLC, 2005 WL 3113028, at *2 (W.D. La. Nov. 
21, 2005) (“The court system will not encourage debtors to take a chance and not disclose assets 
knowing that if they are caught the bankruptcy can be reopened. The judicial system should not 
be abused in this manner.”); see also, e.g., Love v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 2010 WL 114243, at *2 
(S.D. Miss. Jan. 7, 2010) (same); Acuna v. Conn. Ge. Life Ins. Co., 560 F. Supp. 2d 548, 555 
(e .D. Tex. 2008) (same).
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